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This article raises concerns about the degree to which potential 
donors are aware that their layman‖s understanding of death may 
not be the same as that enshrined in protocols employing the cri-
terion of brain death. There would seem to be a need for greater 
public education of a kind which acknowledges the debate 
around the practical and conceptual difficulties associated with 
brain death, and makes clear what the implications of a diagnosis 
of brain death are for the donor and his or her relatives. The re-
mainder of the article explores the discrepancy between the 
modern concept of brain death and the traditional Buddhist un-
derstanding of death as the loss of the body‖s organic integrity as 
opposed to simply the loss of its cerebral functions. 
  
                                                             
* Goldsmiths College, University of London. Email: d.keown@gold.ac.uk 
. 
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Introduction 
I first addressed the question of brain death in 1995 in the context of a 
discussion of end-of-life issues in my book Buddhism and Bioethics (1995, 
2001). At that time I expressed the view that the concept of brain death 
would be acceptable to Buddhism, and that brain death was identical 
with human death. Since then, however, I have come to doubt this as-
sessment and now believe that although brain death usually heralds the 
imminent demise of the patient it does not equate to death itself. I took 
the opportunity to express my thoughts briefly on this matter in a re-
view of a recent book by Karma Lekshe Tsomo entitled Into the Jaws of 
Yama, Lord of Death: Buddhism, Bioethics, and Death (2006), and in the 
present article set out my thoughts on the matter more fully.1 Karma 
Lekshe Tsomo is a Tibetan Buddhist nun, and it is mainly within Tibetan 
Buddhism that the problems she discusses concerning death and organ 
transplantation have come to the fore, no doubt because of the distinc-
tive teachings of that school concerning death and dying. However, I be-
lieve there is an underlying problematic here for all schools of Buddhism 
revolving around a conflict between the motivation to help others and 
respect for the principle of ahiṃsā, or non-harming. My own construc-
tion of the Buddhist position,2 to anticipate the conclusions which fol-
low, anticipates serious reservations concerning the current medical 
practice of cadaver organ transplantation. This is not because Buddhism 
is opposed to organ donation per se, but because it rejects the concept of 
“brain death,” which is typically used to determine death prior to the 
harvesting of organs.3  
Karma Lekshe Tsomo provides three reasons in support of organ 
donation. 
Organ donation is considered a valuable opportunity on several 
levels. First, to donate one‖s body for research or organ trans-
plantation is a way to sever attachment to one‖s own body. 
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Second, to place another person‖s welfare above one‖s own is a 
perfect expression of the bodhisattva ethic of compassion. Third, 
to donate one‖s organs with the pure motivation to benefit others 
will bring great fruits of merit in future lives, enabling one to 
gain a fortunate rebirth and further opportunities for Dharma 
practice; if the gift is dedicated to the enlightenment of all be-
ings, the fruits are immeasurable. (Tsomo 156) 
The above sums up the initial reaction of most Buddhists when the ques-
tion of organ donation is raised. When informed about the details of the 
procedure, however, Tibetan lamas in particular change their view al-
most immediately because of their beliefs about the “subtle body.” Ac-
cording to Tibetan teachings,4 even if there is no measurable brain 
activity, the subtle body is still functioning, “winds” and “drops” are still 
circulating, and consciousness is still resident in the body. As one au-
thority sums it up:  
This means that from a Tibetan point of view organ harvesting 
done within three days after the stoppage of the heart is basically 
the same as cutting organs out of a living being. And this causes 
great pain, as well as the accompanying negative mental states 
that one would generate if someone were to come up with a knife 
and cut you open and then take out organs. This of course would 
lead to a lower rebirth, so Tibetans generally wait three days be-
fore disposing of the corpse, which is three days longer than the 
organs are viable for transplant.5  
Tibetan Buddhist views about death and dying have been adequately do-
cumented elsewhere and I will not describe them again here. The prob-
lems that arise in the context of organ transplantation, however, are not 
confined to Tibetan Buddhism (or even to Buddhism alone). In the dis-
cussion below, I will draw mainly on Theravādin sources, since I am 
more familiar with these. From this it should become clear that the 
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problem is a general one and raises issues which transcend sectarian 
boundaries.   
Organ Donation 
Although relatively few people will ever need an organ transplant, the 
subject of brain death will be of interest to anyone who wonders 
whether or not they should carry donor cards so their organs can be 
used after their death.6 Opportunities to become an organ donor are rou-
tinely provided on official documents in many countries, and consenting 
often involves little more than ticking a box.7 In doing so, the donor is 
consenting to undergo a major surgical operation in which one or more 
vital organs will be removed in circumstances which may have unappre-
ciated implications both for the patient and any relatives in attendance 
at the time of death. The wording of such consent forms (which typically 
speak of providing the “gift of life” to someone “after my death”)8 offers 
no clear definition of what “death” is understood to mean or how it will 
be diagnosed. Although in most medical contexts this is not an issue, in 
the context of organ transplantation death may mean something rather 
different from what the layman imagines. Donors may be unaware, for 
instance, that following a diagnosis of brain death, organs are commonly 
removed before life support is discontinued, and while many vital signs 
are still being registered. Before the removal of organs, brain dead 
patients continue to receive nutrition, hydration and medication (un-
heard of in the case of a dead body), and they may even be resuscitated if 
necessary to preserve their organs. Such patients are warm, their meta-
bolism is functioning, and movements of the limbs are often observed. It 
is not uncommon for an anesthetic to be administered to control the 
patient‖s reactions, and not infrequently such “dead” patients have to be 
strapped to the operating table to control their spontaneous movements 
while the surgeons make an incision along the length of the torso and 
remove the organs while the heart is still beating. When the incision is 
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made, patients may react with an increase in blood pressure, heartbeat 
and adrenaline production, symptoms associated with stress or pain in 
other operations.9 Potential donors are rarely made aware that these 
facts, and whatever else the decision involves, the intensive medical 
interventions that are required mean that the patient will not be allowed 
to die peacefully surrounded by relatives, which is the kind of death 
most people would wish for themselves, and perhaps imagine they will 
undergo before their organs are harvested.  
This is not to suggest that potential donors are deliberately 
misled, and transplant-facilitation websites provide abundant informa-
tion in the form of FAQ files in an endeavor to anticipate donors' con-
cerns. For obvious reasons, however, few provide the kind of 
information that might deter donors, and I have not seen any that sug-
gest that the contemporary concept of brain death is in any way contro-
versial, despite critiques in medical journals and elsewhere over several 
years.10  
Commendably, some transplant websites attempt to address spe-
cifically religious concerns. Under its main FAQ, the UK Transplant web-
site asks, “Are there religious objections to organ and tissue donation?” 
The answer is a reassuring negative: “No, none of the major religions in 
the UK object to organ and tissue donation and transplantation. If you 
have any doubts you should discuss them with your spiritual or religious 
adviser” (UK Transplant.org FAQ 24).  Elsewhere, under a section titled 
“Religious Perspectives” the website states, “All the UK‖s major religions 
support organ donation and transplantation, and many actively promote 
it.” However, the accompanying summary of the Buddhist position 
hardly suggests strong support for organ donation. The entry reads as 
follows: 
 There are no injunctions in Buddhism for or against organ 
donation.  
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 In some traditions, the moment of death is defined according 
to criteria that differ from those of modern Western medi-
cine, and there are differing views as to the acceptability of 
organ transplantation.  
 The needs and wishes of the dying person must not be 
compromised by the wish to save a life. Each decision will de-
pend on individual circumstances.  
 Central to Buddhism is a wish to relieve suffering and there 
may be circumstances where organ donation may be seen as 
an act of generosity. Where it is truly the wish of the dying 
person, it would be seen in that light. (UK Transplant.org Re-
ligious Perspectives) 
A survey of religious representatives sponsored by the UK Organ Dona-
tion Taskforce reported its findings in an August 2009 article entitled 
“Faith Leaders United in their Support for Organ Donation: Findings 
from the UK Organ Donation Taskforce Study” (Randhawa et al.). How-
ever, the discussions as reported did not explore any of the problematic 
issues surrounding the definition of death with interviewees, and the au-
thors of the article recognize that “For many faiths, debate on organ do-
nation is at an early stage and their views thus represent preliminary 
thoughts on what are complex moral and ethical issues” (2).11 Perhaps 
this important qualification needs to be featured more prominently if 
potential donors from religious groups are to make an informed choice. 
The American website Give Life; The Transplant Journey is more circum-
spect with regard to Buddhism and under a section titled “Does my Reli-
gion Object to Donation?” states simply: “Buddhism: Donation is a matter 
of individual conscience” (Give Life). 
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Generosity (dāna) 
It is certainly true that the motivation to help others is seen as a good 
thing by Buddhism. There are many examples of selfless giving through-
out Buddhist literature. One thinks of Prince Vessantara, who gave away 
his kingdom, wife, and children, and there are more specific examples of 
generosity in connection with the donation of the body as food for ani-
mals and humans. In the well-known story of the bodhisattva and the 
hungry tigress found in the Jatakamālā and Suvarnaprabhāsa Sūtra, prince 
Mahasattva throws himself before a starving tigress and slits his throat 
with a splinter of wood so the tigress will eat his body. The Sivi Jātaka 
refers to the donation and transplantation of two eyes by King Sivi to a 
Brahmin,12 and Har Dayal recounts many similar stories of dāna in his 
classic work The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (181ff). 
In his book Burning for the Buddha, James Benn lists examples from Chi-
nese Buddhism of monks donating their own flesh as food or medicine 
for others. One of these was Daojin, a disciple of the great translator 
Dharmakṣema (385-433), who sliced the flesh from his own body, salted 
it, and donated it to starving villagers during a famine. Examples could 
be multiplied, but it seems clear that the donation of the body and its 
parts has a long literary history in Buddhist sources.13 At the same time, 
it needs to be born in mind that stories describing heroic deeds by ad-
vanced practitioners are perhaps best read as moral fables intended to 
inspire piety, rather than practical examples to follow in everyday life. A 
lay Buddhist who followed the example of Vessantara and gave away his 
children to the first person who asked for them would probably be re-
garded as criminally irresponsible rather than a model parent. Like other 
virtues, generosity needs to be moderated by prudence, and practiced in 
a balanced and appropriate way. 
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Defining Death 
In order to explore the Buddhist perspective systematically with the aim 
of reaching practical and workable conclusions in harmony with Bud-
dhist teachings and modern medical science, I think, in common with 
other contemporary philosophical discussions of death,14 we need to be 
able to do three things: (1) provide a Buddhist definition of death; (2) 
establish the criteria for declaring death; and (3) specify the empirical 
tests for death that will enable physicians to know when the criteria for 
death have been fulfilled. Tsomo, in her volume referred to earlier, offers 
no explicit definition of death or a defense of one. In fact she seems to 
have little hope of reconciling Buddhist and scientific viewpoints on 
questions of the kind I have just identified. This is because she sees the 
absence of any scientific means of detecting the presence of what she 
calls the “subtle consciousness” as a major obstacle to determining when 
death has occurred. According to traditional Tibetan teachings, death is 
believed to occur when this consciousness leaves the body to embark on 
its journey through the bardo, or intermediate realm, and for Tsomo this 
metaphysical belief appears to mark a point at which Buddhism and 
science must part company. While I agree that Buddhism may differ 
from current medical orthodoxy on the question of brain death, I do not 
believe it is for metaphysical reasons, or because religion and science are 
in some sense irreconcilable. Christianity has faced substantially the 
same predicament in terms of reconciling theological viewpoints on the 
relationship between soul and body with scientific beliefs about life and 
death, and has managed to evolve solutions that are thought consistent 
both with doctrine and science.15 In fact, the discipline of bioethics itself 
largely arose from efforts by Christian theologians in the 1960s to come 
to terms with the challenges that medical science presented to their be-
liefs. Buddhism now needs to engage in the same kind of critical reflec-
tion in order to derive moral conclusions that are compatible both with 
scientific fact and its own traditional beliefs and values. 
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Traditional Teachings on Death 
Although Tibetan traditions surrounding death are rich and complex, 
there is an underlying continuity with their Indian counterparts in 
terms of what marks the difference between a living body and a dead 
one. The traditional Buddhist criteria are well know and are found in the 
Majjhima and Saṃyutta Nikāyas. Here, reference is made to three crite-
ria that distinguish a living body from a dead body. The three are vitality 
(āyu), heat (usmā), and consciousness (viññāṇa) (S.iii.143). The first two, 
vitality and heat, are said to be interrelated and compared to a lamp and 
its light (M.i.295). For this reason I prefer to see them as representing a 
single phenomenon, namely the process of vitality and the accompany-
ing heat which that process generates. In modern terms, perhaps vitality 
would correspond to the metabolic processes that take place in the body, 
and heat to the energy that these processes liberate. The absence of 
vitality, then, can be detected by the absence of heat. Bodily cooling is a 
widely recognized concomitant of death and is known as algor mortis, the 
process by which the temperature of a body drops from its normal 37 
degrees centigrade, assuming normal conditions, until it reaches the 
ambient environmental temperature. Further observable signs include 
skin pallor, changes in the eyes such as loss of pressure and marking of 
red blood cells, flaccidity in the primary muscles, lividity or livor mortis 
(the process of blood flowing downwards and causing a reddish-purple 
color on the skin), rigor mortis which sets in three to four hours after 
death and lasts between thirty-six and forty-eight hours, and also, some-
times, spontaneous movements in the feet and legs caused by biochemi-
cal reactions (perhaps giving rise to a belief in spirit possession in some 
quarters). 
Given the practice of the “cemetery meditations,” Buddhist 
monks must have observed many of these signs themselves, so it is inter-
esting that the compilers of the Pāli canon came up with such a re-
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stricted checklist—basically just the absence of heat—when determining 
death. I suggest that this has much to do with Buddhist meditational 
practice and the knowledge that individuals could enter trance-like 
states resembling death and remain there for some considerable length 
of time without respiration or heartbeat. Examples of stories such as that 
of the elder Mahanāga, who, according to Buddhaghosa (Visuddhimagga 
706), remained seated in trance while the meditation hall burnt down 
around him, bear witness to this. Determining if such a person had 
passed away or not must have on occasion been a problem. Indeed, the 
Mahāvedalla-sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya specifically addresses the ques-
tion of the difference between a person who is dead (mato kālakato) and 
one who is in the state of cessation (saññāvedayitanirodho) (M.i.296), so 
this was clearly a point of interest and concern.  
Indeed we have an interesting canonical example of a wrong 
declaration of death being made in connection with the Buddha himself. 
The Mahāparinibbāna-sutta reports how the Buddha ascended through 
the eight jhānas and attained the state of saññāvedayitanirodha at which 
point Ānanda, despite his personal proximity to the Buddha over 
twenty-five years, was unable to determine whether his master was still 
alive or not. He turned to the Venerable Anuruddha for guidance and 
was informed that his master had not yet passed away but had attained 
“the cessation of perception and feeling” (saññāvedayitanirodha) 
(D.ii.156).16 
The commentary explains that Ānanda thought the Buddha was 
dead because he saw no sign of respiration, and the commentary to the 
Saṃyutta Nikāya elaborates as follows: 
Having seen the Blessed One taking no inbreath or outbreath 
when he had attained the cessation of perception and feeling, 
men and deities all at once cried out because they thought that 
the Master had attained parinibbāna. Ānanda Thera too asked the 
11 Journal of Buddhist Ethics 
elder Anuruddha if the Blessed One had attained parinibbāna. 
The elder replied that the Tathāgata had not yet attained 
parinibbāna, but had attained the cessation of perception and 
feeling. (SA.i.223)  
The commentary to the Dīgha Nikāya continues: “Then they knew: ―Now 
the Blessed One has attained cessation (nirodha); and within cessation 
death cannot occur‖” (DA.ii.594). This is a reference to a belief that in the 
state of cessation all of the normal physiological processes are sus-
pended and the subject exists in a state of suspended animation. The 
Buddha, at this point, was poised between life and death, and the death 
could not occur until he exited the state of cessation. Later Theravādin 
scholastic thought explains this phenomenon by reference to the con-
cept of the bhavaṅga, or sub-consciousness, a stream of momentary mo-
ments of animating consciousness operating at an organic level.17 The 
commentator Dhammapāla explains that the process of dying requires 
bhavaṅga (presumably since death is an organic process as I will suggest 
below) and that the subject must emerge from the state of cessation in 
order to die because there is no bhavaṅga in the state itself.18 As can be 
seen from this example, the phenomenon of the state of cessation—a 
state in which the subject is alive but where the body generates no vital 
signs—presents major obstacles to any methodology which claims it can 
define the moment of death with precision.   
Resuming the narrative of the Buddha‖s death, we are told that 
after emerging from the state of cessation, the Buddha passed down 
through the jhānas to the first and again to the fourth at which point he 
expired. The text does not tell us how those present were sure the 
Buddha had actually died at this point. Perhaps clairvoyant powers came 
into play, or his body in due course became cold. Fortunately, in his case 
some rather dramatic confirmation was provided in the form of an 
earthquake and thunder, and it would be very convenient if such clear 
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signs were given in every case. Unfortunately, they are not, and we are 
left instead only with the two criteria the texts provide to help us distin-
guish between life and death: one biological (vitality manifested in the 
form of heat) and the other metaphysical (the presence of viññāṇa or 
consciousness).  
In fact what these early sources provide us with, in terms of my 
earlier distinction, is actually a definition of death and an empirical test 
for death rolled up into one. The Mahāvedalla-sutta tells us that a body 
without vitality, heat, and consciousness is like an unconscious piece of 
wood (yathā kaṭṭhaṃ acetanaṃ). In other words, it is a corpse. Accordingly 
we might define death in religious or metaphysical terms as the perma-
nent separation of the soul (or spirit) from the body. Buddhists might 
prefer a different form of words such as the separation of the immaterial 
(nāma) from the material (rūpa) components of the composite human 
individual. The test for death we are given to help determine when this 
separation has come about is the absence of heat in the body. So, the 
early sources have given us a start, but I think we can build further on 
these foundations. In particular, it would be good to evolve a definition 
which was less esoteric and could be accepted by Buddhists and non-
Buddhists alike. Let us see if we can make any progress towards such a 
definition. 
The Buddhist definition of death 
An important preliminary point to clarify is whether our concept of 
death is one of the death of the whole body, or of the death of the body as a 
whole. The strictest definition of death would be the former since it 
would involve the destruction of every cell in the body, as might happen, 
for example, in an atomic blast. But this is surely too strict a requirement 
and in general we are happy to accept that people are dead long before 
their bodies are destroyed or reduced to ashes in the crematorium. The 
same might be said of putrefaction. Buddhist monks have often contem-
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plated decaying corpses in the charnel ground and know that this is a 
process that takes some time, and that individuals are dead long before 
the flesh has decayed and the bones have turned to dust. I suggest, then, 
that the Buddhist understanding of death is that of the death of the body 
as a whole rather than the death of the whole of its parts.  
The notion of disintegration seems to be a key element in the 
Buddhist concept of death. According to Buddhist teachings, the death of 
a human being occurs when the constitutive elements of the psycho-
physical individual lose their integrity. In traditional terminology this is 
thought to be when the mind-body composite made up of the five 
“aggregates” (khandhas) disintegrates. Another traditional way of 
speaking about this is by reference to the dissolution of the elements 
(dhātu) of earth, water, fire, wind, and consciousness. In this sense, per-
haps we could say that death marks the point of transition from unity to 
multiplicity, or from a functioning whole organism to a collection of 
body parts. In its description of a dead body, the Mahāvedalla-sutta (i.296) 
refers to the sense-faculties (indriya) as “completely broken up” (viparib-
hinna). In other words, the senses of taste, touch, and smell etc have be-
come disintegrated and their operation is no longer coordinated as they 
would be in a living self-regulating organism. It is this lack of integration 
that characterizes death and distinguishes it from life. Frequent refer-
ence is made elsewhere in Buddhist texts to death as the “break-up of 
the body” (kāyassa bheda), and I suggest this concept of break-up and 
disintegration is at the heart of Buddhist thinking about death. Once the 
break-up of the body takes place, the five aggregates are sundered, and 
the individual is dead. Since physical disintegration is a fundamental 
part of this process, and since there cannot be human life if there is no 
functioning organic basis for it, it seems we can define death not just in 
spiritual or metaphysical terms but also in biological ones. If as a result 
of physical disintegration the biological conditions necessary to support 
life are not present, there can be no living being. Or to put it another 
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way, if there is no integrated living body, there can be no mind-body 
aggregate, no five khandhas, and so no human being. Following this line 
of argument, then, a definition of death that might be acceptable to 
Buddhism without depending on, or making reference to, any specific 
Buddhist doctrine, could be (as I proposed in 1995): death is the irreversible 
loss of integrated organic functioning (Keown 158).  
If the above is correct, it seems we can have two definitions of 
death: an esoteric and an exoteric one, and perhaps we can think of 
them as two sides of the same coin. If viññāṇa, or what Tsomo call the 
“subtle consciousness,” is indeed an integrated part of the functioning 
human being as Buddhist teachings suggest, then the definition of death 
as the loss of integrated functioning will also include the disintegration 
of the elements which compose a human being, of which the “subtle 
consciousness” is one.  We learn from Tsomo (86f, 219) that just like 
modern doctors, traditional Tibetan physicians make use of tests which 
are purely physiological in nature, such as bodily heat, secretions, ana-
lyzing the urine of critically ill patients, taking the “death pulse,” and 
ultimately bodily putrefaction. Although Tibetans may regard these as 
testing for the presence of the subtle consciousness, it becomes clear on 
reflection that this is really only a corollary of what the tests show. Be-
cause death also occurs to entities such as vegetables (which according 
to mainstream Buddhist teachings do not possess consciousness and do 
not transmigrate) it is clear that life and death can be defined purely in 
biological terms independently of any reference to metaphysical enti-
ties. 
My reason for providing an exoteric definition of death based on 
physiological criteria is that it allows Buddhist to build a bridge with 
medical science and other religions. This alternative definition makes no 
reference to a subtle consciousness or other metaphysical phenomena. 
Accounts of the death process in terms of “winds,” “humors,” and the 
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“clear light of death” may well retain a place for insiders, as in the case 
of those who undergo near-death experiences (NDE), or of Christians 
who believe the soul separates from the body on death. Reflective be-
lievers, however, will generally accept that such accounts must dovetail 
with the biological phenomena which accompany death and which are 
known to science.   
The criteria for declaring death 
Turning now to the criteria for declaring death, the problem is essentially 
one of specifying the physiological conditions that are a sine qua non for 
supporting the continuing relationship between the spiritual and ma-
terial components (let us use the Buddhist terminology of nāma and 
rūpa) of the unitary human individual. Or, to put it the other way round, 
in the absence of what conditions can we be sure that there is no sub-
sisting relationship between the two? 
The early sources provide us with a test for death, namely the 
loss of bodily heat, but we now need to ask what that test is telling us. In 
other words, what conditions are fulfilled when a human body loses 
heat, and why are these conditions of importance? Is it the case, for in-
stance, that a body loses heat at death because viññāṇa is hot, and when 
it goes the body cools? I would think not, so what we need is some fur-
ther elucidation of the significance of this test in relation to our defini-
tion of death so that we can make the criteria for death more explicit. 
Given our earlier definition, our criteria for death should make reference 
to the point at which the basic life-support systems of an organism have 
broken down and irreversibly ceased to function. This is the point at 
which the biological integrity of the individual has been lost, and the 
rūpa or material form of the human body will begin an irreversible 
process of deterioration.  
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The criterion which is today almost universally accepted in mod-
ern medicine is that of brain death, either the death of the whole brain 
(as in the USA) or of the brain stem (as in the UK). This criterion was first 
proposed in 1968 and subsequently became established in the early 
1980s. In 1981 it was incorporated into the Uniform Declaration of Death 
Act (UDDA), which has since been adopted by almost all fifty states of the 
USA.19 Tsomo is clearly unhappy with the criterion of brain death, and 
seems to assume this leaves Buddhism out on a limb and in some way 
opposed to science. I share her unease about brain death, but do not be-
lieve this places Buddhism at odds with science. In fact, a number of 
people, including doctors and philosophers, are skeptical about the brain 
death criterion, and there is a growing body of dissident literature20 
which believes that the criterion is conceptually and scientifically 
flawed.  
The criterion as enshrined in the UDDA holds that death can be 
equated with “irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,” 
but as critics point out there are serious problems with this definition 
and others like it. The first is that that there many such definitions and 
many associated protocols worldwide for the diagnosis of brain death, 
suggesting an underlying lack of scientific rigor surrounding the con-
cept. Second, even if agreement existed on a single protocol, total cessa-
tion of brain function is rare in transplant candidates and residual vital 
signs continue to be registered (these are described more fully below). 
Third, the loss of function in an organ is not the same as the destruction 
of that organ: function can come and go in the way that a computer can 
be turned on and off while remaining fully serviceable: the fact that 
function is not presently observed does not mean that it cannot return. 
A fully secure definition of brain death would require nothing less than 
the total destruction of the brain tissue through necrosis (cell death), as 
occurs, for example, due to ischemia (loss of blood flow) over a period of 
time. If the brain were truly dead (as opposed to not being seen to func-
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tion during a limited period of observation) it would provide strong evi-
dence of human death, but this is not what the brain death protocol 
requires. A fourth difficulty is that the requirement for irreversibility is 
problematic, since irreversibility is a prognosis, not a demonstrable 
medical fact (many conditions once deemed “irreversible” are today 
easily curable). Fifth and finally, the tests for brain death are incapable 
by themselves of confirming the condition they are testing for without 
the prior exclusion of a range of other possible causes of coma, such as 
barbiturate poisoning or hypothermia. In other words, there is no fail-
safe medical test (or group of tests) for brain death. In the last analysis 
the diagnosis of death by neurological criteria alone is difficult to sup-
port on the basis of scientific fact. Current methods used to diagnose 
brain death with a view to prompt transplantation, moreover, often in-
volve haste and in many cases the proper protocols are not followed.21 
The above concerns are of a kind that do not arise from metaphysical 
beliefs that are irreconcilable with science, but rather from the intrinsic 
weaknesses of a criterion for death that has become established in mod-
ern medical practice, largely, as many believe, in order to facilitate organ 
transplantation.22  
We may wonder why the brain has come to be seen of such im-
portance in the diagnosis of death. There are two main reasons, the first 
medical and the second philosophical or cultural. The medical reason is 
that the brain is thought to coordinate or orchestrate all vital bodily 
functions, such that when it ceases to function a total “systems failure” 
involving the collapse of the cardiovascular and respiratory system is 
imminent. The second reason is that an influential strand of Western 
thought has come to identify consciousness with the self, a view summed 
up in Descartes‖s famous dictum cogito ergo sum. Those who take a Carte-
sian or Lockean view of personal identity thus tend to see the loss of 
consciousness as equivalent to the death of the human person. Going 
beyond the current standard of brain death, some bioethicists who hold 
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this dualistic view of human nature (in terms of which self-conscious-
ness is the unique defining characteristic of a human being) would be 
prepared to declare a permanently unconscious patient dead23 even 
though the brain may be functioning, the heart beating, and respiration 
continuing unaided.24 
Often the medical and cultural reasons become blurred, and 
when the medical reasons are challenged, supporters of the brain death 
criterion fall back on reasons of a philosophical kind, conceding that the 
patient is not dead but is “as good as dead” due to being in a state similar 
to coma or “persistent vegetative state” (PVS). Indeed, there is often 
confusion in the minds of medical practitioners about what brain death 
actually involves, and many assume that it means simply permanent loss 
of consciousness. Loss of consciousness, however, even if permanent, is 
simply an impairment, and is quite different from bodily death under-
stood as the irreversible loss of organic functioning, as defined earlier. 
While no one would wish to exist in a state of unconsciousness, such a 
judgment presupposes at a minimum that an unconscious patient is still 
alive. It may be noted in passing that the diagnosis of coma and PVS is 
far from straightforward, and errors are frequently made when assessing 
a patient‖s level of conscious awareness.25 
I have never been persuaded that the philosophical reasons just 
mentioned (often used to support the position known “cognitive death”) 
are compatible with Buddhist teachings, and my earlier reasons for ac-
cepting the standard of brain death were of the medical kind, namely 
that the death of the brain, including the brain stem, seemed to marks 
the point at which the human organism loses the capacity for self-
regulation (and not simply the capacity for consciousness). However, I 
have had increasing doubts about the scientific reliability of this crite-
rion for two main reasons. The first is that it places too much emphasis 
on a single bodily organ, namely the brain. Vital though the brain is to 
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the exercise of the higher cognitive capacities and the regulation of 
important bodily systems, it seems to be going too far to equate the life 
of a human being with the functioning of a single organ. In fact for one 
period of our lives—namely during the early stages of fetal develop-
ment—we exist without a brain at all. An early fetus has no functioning 
brain, and is therefore not conscious, but is undeniably alive. Another 
problematic example concerns the case of brain dead mothers who have 
subsequently gone on to give birth, in one case 107 days after brain 
death was diagnosed.26 It seems strange to describe a woman‖s body 
functioning as an organic whole in this way—even to the extent of pro-
ducing breast milk for her unborn child27—as “dead,” and if medical 
opinion is saying that dead patients can give birth it would seem to have 
lost touch with the ordinary common-sense understanding of what the 
words “life” and “death” mean. 
When all is said and done we do not live two lives—a brain life 
and a body life—and die two deaths—a brain death and a body death. One 
and the same life manifests itself in our brain and body, and throughout 
the psycho-physical unity which is a human being. According to Bud-
dhist teachings, mental awareness (mano-viññāna) is not the essence of a 
human being (the doctrine of anattā denies there is any such essence), 
and is only one of six forms of consciousness diffused throughout the 
human body. Even though mental awareness may be lost temporarily or 
permanently, this does not mean that the deeper underlying forms of 
organic consciousness or viññāna—which I prefer to translate as “sen-
tiency”28—do not continue. For these reasons it seems overly narrow to 
determine life and death by reference to the brain alone, and we need to 
take a more holistic, organic view of the human individual in life if we 
are to understand what is lost in death. 
The second kind of reasons collectively constitute what might be 
termed the problem of “vital signs,” alluded to above. This means simply 
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that after a diagnosis of brain death many vital signs are still being regis-
tered, which casts serious doubt on the accuracy of the diagnosis. This 
problem arises because the brain does not, as commonly thought, coor-
dinate all vital bodily functions. For example, while the brain stem helps 
regulate heartbeat it does not cause it: the heart has its own internal 
pacemaker and can continue beating for some time even when totally 
removed from the body (up to an hour in the case of some animal 
hearts). In the case of the lungs, the ventilator simply introduces oxy-
genated air, while respiration (the exchange of gases with the environ-
ment) continues at the cellular level independently of the brain. A 
corpse cannot be ventilated; a ventilator will only support life in a body 
that is already alive. Apart from respiration, the neural regulation of 
body temperature also continues, and the spinal cord and peripheral 
nervous system still function, implying some level of continuing organic 
integration. Essential neurological functions also continue in the brain 
itself, such as the regulated secretion of hypothalamic hormones. EEG 
activity is detected in around twenty percent of brain-dead patients, and 
(as noted above) when an incision is made to retrieve organs the “dead” 
patient displays a cardiovascular response to stress in the form of in-
creased blood pressure. 
The continuation of multiple vital signs presents striking counter-
evidence to a theory which claims that the loss of function in the brain is 
equivalent to death. This is experienced as emotional dissonance by rela-
tives who are shown the warm body of a relative whose heart is beating 
while being told by doctors that the patient has passed away.   
The tests for death 
There is normally no problem about deciding if a person is alive or dead 
unless it has to be done in a hurry. The problem of making an early 
determination of death has arisen exclusively in the context of cadaver 
organ transplantation. For a successful transplant the organs must be 
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harvested while they are freshly oxygenated, and this usually takes place 
between six and twenty-four hours after brain death has been declared. 
In the interim, artificial ventilation is maintained and respiration and 
heartbeat continue. The body retains its normal vital signs which include 
the presence of heat. If ventilation is discontinued and the body is al-
lowed to cool, the internal organs would rapidly deteriorate and the 
prospects for a successful transplant would be greatly reduced. 
The classical Buddhist definition of death in terms of the loss of 
heat makes no reference to the brain at all, or to any other bodily organ. 
This is not surprising given the experience of profound states of sus-
pended animation induced by meditation, such as cessation (nirodha). 
Even at lower levels of absorption, such as the fourth jhāna, respiration 
ceases altogether (S.iv.217), which is clearly why the absence of respira-
tion is similarly not regarded as an adequate test for death. However, the 
traditional Buddhist test for death— loss of bodily heat—can, I think, be 
associated quite successfully with the definition of death I offered ear-
lier, namely that death is the permanent loss of integrated organic func-
tioning. The absence of heat is simply one way of telling us that the 
internal self-regulation of the organism has been irreversibly lost and 
that the body‖s metabolic processes have ceased.  
A problem with the Buddhist test of heat loss is that it takes ra-
ther a long time before death can be declared. Loss of heat on the skin 
takes from eight to twelve hours, but the centre of the body takes about 
three times as long to cool down to the ambient temperature. If one 
wanted to wait for confirmation of death following the total loss of bodi-
ly heat, there would seem no reason not to do so in normal circum-
stances, subject to demands on hospital resources. After all, the dead are 
in no hurry. However, in practice I think doctors would not want to con-
fine themselves simply to testing for bodily heat, and there are tradi-
tional tests for death which have served doctors well long before the 
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advent of the brain death criterion. Before then, the loss of heartbeat 
and respiration were the main tests used. Tests developed for brain 
death can provide additional confirmation, and using a combination of 
traditional and more recent tests one would know very soon and with a 
high degree of confidence that death had taken place. If we want to be 
more specific, a robust set of tests would seem to be one that referenced 
the cardiovascular, respiratory and nervous systems. The breakdown of 
these three major bodily systems appears to confirm the irreversible loss 
of structural integrity. 
Organ Transplantation 
As suggested above, the concept of brain death was invented largely to 
enable the transplant of organs. The weakness of the concept itself has 
become increasingly apparent over the past forty years, and recently 
even leading supporters of transplantation have accepted it is no longer 
coherent. Writing recently in the New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Ro-
bert D. Truog goes so far as to call frankly for the abandonment of the 
“dead donor rule” (the requirement that the donor must be declared 
dead before the removal of organs) and its replacement with a system of 
informed consent that would allow the removal of organs without hav-
ing to conform to the present “flawed definitions of death” (i.e. brain 
death). He suggests that use of the brain-death standard to legitimize 
explantation “suggests that the medical profession has been gerryman-
dering the definition of death to carefully conform with conditions that 
are most favourable for transplantation” (Truog 675). He sums up as fol-
lows: 
The concept of brain death has served us well and has been the 
ethical and legal justification for thousands of lifesaving dona-
tions and transplantations. Even so, there have been persistent 
questions about whether patients with massive brain injury, ap-
nea [inability to breathe], and loss of brain-stem reflexes are 
23 Journal of Buddhist Ethics 
really dead. After all, when the injury is entirely intercranial, 
these patients look very much alive: they are warm and pink; 
they digest and metabolize food, excrete waste, undergo sexual 
maturation, and can even reproduce. To a casual observer, they 
look just like patients who are receiving long-term artificial 
ventilation and are asleep. (Truog 674) 
“The arguments about why these patients should be considered dead,” 
he adds, “have never been fully convincing.” Truog‖s views were 
summed up in a recent critical publication by British philosopher David 
S. Oderberg, who writes: 
Bioethicists Robert Truog and Franklin Miller suggested that 
since surgeons have for many years not really been adhering to 
any viable criterion of death before extracting a person‖s organs, 
this suggests that neither they nor anyone else involved consid-
ers the “dead donor” rule to be anything but an ethical fig leaf—
vague, indefinable, but used as an excuse to assuage one‖s con-
science before transplantation is performed. Far better, they be-
lieve, to leave the issue to the “informed consent” of patients or 
their surrogates. Whether the “donor” is dead or alive is of no 
ethical importance. (Oderberg 98-109)29 
In a similar vein, an editorial in Nature in October 2009, openly recog-
nizing the scientific ambiguity surrounding current definitions of brain 
death, stated “The time has come for a serious discussion on redrafting 
laws that push doctors towards a form of deceit.” “Ideally,” it stated, 
“the law should be changed to describe more accurately and honestly 
the way that death is determined in clinical practice” (570).30 If public 
opinion and legislatures can be persuaded by such arguments, the cur-
rent practice of organ transplantation may well accelerate, and donors 
would at least be able to make a truly informed choice in the knowledge 
that death had been medically redefined to no longer mean what most 
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people thought it meant. The danger, however, is that once death no 
longer has a clear organic basis, such redefinition could continue indefi-
nitely, and widen progressively to include in its scope people who were a 
little “less dead” each time. 
Conclusion 
This article began by raising concerns about informed consent, and the 
degree to which potential donors are aware that their layman‖s under-
standing of death may not be the same as that enshrined in protocols 
employing the criterion of brain death. There would seem to be a need 
for greater public education of a kind which acknowledges the debate 
around the practical and conceptual difficulties associated with brain 
death, and makes clear what the implications of a diagnosis of brain 
death are for the donor and his or her relatives. The remainder of the ar-
ticle explored the discrepancy between the modern concept of brain 
death and the traditional Buddhist understanding of death as the loss of 
the body‖s organic integrity as opposed to simply the loss of its cerebral 
functions. The central concern here is that if brain-dead patients are not 
really dead, to practice solid organ explantation—such as the removal of 
the heart, liver, kidney or pancreas from a beating-heart donor—would 
itself cause the somatic death of the patient. The fact that this is done 
with the intention of saving life may be a mitigating factor, but in Bud-
dhist terms it still constitutes the intentional killing of a living being. 
The fact that none of this is done in the patient‖s own interest gives fur-
ther grounds for caution.  
So where does this leave us on the ethics of organ transplanta-
tion? The conclusion seems to be that the brain death criterion is in-
compatible with what major Buddhist schools teach about the time of 
death. If this is so, it raises concerns for Buddhists who wish to support 
organ donation programs since their religion defines death differently to 
current medical practice. The caution of the early sources—which do not 
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even accept cessation of respiration or pulse as proof of death—has to be 
taken seriously, and the simple loss of function in parts (or even all) of 
the brain would seem too uncertain an indicator on which to base judg-
ments which could involve the destruction of human life. There is no 
“magic moment” at which life ends, and in the absence of earthquakes, 
thunder, or the appearance of Māra hovering nearby, it seems safest to 
wait until events have conclusively taken their course. The alternative 
criteria I have proposed, namely the breakdown of the three main sys-
tems—cardiovascular, respiratory, and neurological—would allow an 
earlier diagnosis of death than the loss of bodily heat but would also 
make organ transplantation impractical.  
When all is said and done, death remains a mystery and it would 
be unwise to assume certainty about the nature of the last moments we 
have on earth. As we saw in the case of the Buddha, traditional Buddhist 
teachings concerning the state of cessation (nirodha) mean a person can 
be alive without registering any detectable vital signs. In such matters, 
therefore, it is safer to proceed with caution, not from superstition or ir-
rationality but in acceptance of the limitations of human knowledge and 
out of respect for the dying as they prepare themselves for their transi-
tion to the next life. If there is doubt about precisely when death occurs, 
the benefit of the doubt must be given to the dying patient rather than 
to those who have a vested interest in his death. Inevitably this will lead 
to a loss of donor organs for transplantation, as a result of which many 
lives will be lost (the only acceptable form of transplantation would 
seem to be that of paired organs between living donors). There is no way 
to disguise that this is a hard choice and entails difficult consequences. 
In order to mitigate the damage, resources expended on transplantation 
could be directed into the development of new drugs and alternative 
techniques. Possible treatments include the development of artificial 
hearts, and the use of adult stem cells supplied by the patient to grow 
replacement organs. This would have the advantage of avoiding prob-
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lems of rejection and the serious side-effects of immunodepressant 
drugs. Xenotransplantation (transplanting organs from animals) offers 
another possible way forward, although the ethical implications of this 
for Buddhists are as yet unexplored. None of these techniques will de-
liver results in the short term, but so long as transplantation is seen as 
the primary medical solution to organ failure the alternatives will not 
receive the attention and funding they deserve. A further public policy 
issue concerns public trust and confidence in the medical profession. 
Brain death has become an article of faith for the profession, and in spite 
of its defects, has become widely accepted due to the public‖s trust in 
health care professionals.31 If this trust is weakened, confidence in other 
areas of medical practice will be undermined, and it will not serve the in-
terests of either doctors or their patients to sustain a flawed criterion of 




1 This is a revised and expanded version of “Buddhism, Death and Organ 
Transplantation,” first published in the Journal of the International Associa-
tion of Buddhist Universities 1 (2008), 57-70.  I am grateful to the publishers 
for permission to reuse the material here. 
2 For reflections on what might constitute a “Buddhist view,” see Keown 
1995, 12ff. 
3 As far as I am aware, however, there has been no widespread public dis-
cussion of the validity of the concept of brain death from a Buddhist 
perspective in any country, even Japan, where there is otherwise consi-
derable public opposition to organ transplantation despite recent (2009) 
legislation recognizing the concept of brain death. On the contrast be-
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tween Japanese and American attitudes to transplantation see LaFleur 
2001.   
4 These are described in detail by Tsomo and in other works, including: 
Powers 1995, Lati Rinpoche and Hopkins 1981, and Sogyal Rinpoche 1998.   
5 The words of an anonymous JBE reviewer, to whom I am grateful for 
these and other suggestions. 
6 In the USA, there are approximately 100,000 registrations for trans-
plants at any given time, the vast majority for kidneys and livers (real-
time statistics are available from the website of The Organ Procurement 
and Transplantation Network at www.optn.org). The number of actual 
patients will be fewer than the number of registrations since some 
patients will be registered for more than one organ. In the UK, 
information provided by UK Transplant (www.uktransplant.org) lists 
around 8,000 registrations for transplants, of which just under 7,000 are 
for kidneys. The site claims that 25 percent of the UK population has 
joined the “opt in” NHS Organ Donation Register. In September 2008 an 
Organ Donation Taskforce assessed proposals for a change to a national 
“opt out” system under which consent to organ donation would be pre-
sumed unless individuals specifically exempted themselves. Sweden, 
Austria and Spain already have such a system.  In the USA, a system of 
“required request” or “required referral” operates under which doctors 
must make enquiries regarding the possible use of the organs of any 
patient diagnosed as brain dead. 
7 For a perceptive discussion of the cultural reasons facilitating public ac-
ceptance of organ transplantation in the West see LaFleur 2001. 
8
 The wording of the UK form is “I want to donate the following for trans-
plantation after my death,” followed by a list of options. 
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9 There is debate around the interpretation of these reactions, and some 
doctors dismiss them simply as “reflexes,” but this begs the question as 
to whether the patient is alive or dead since a living body also exhibits 
identical “reflexes.” 
10 The UK Transplant website, for example, provides very full informa-
tion on many aspects of transplant procedure. What it fails to address in 
its otherwise exemplary FAQ, however, is the central question of 
whether brain death is really the same as human death. It poses the 
question “How do they know you are really dead?” (question 7), and in 
response reassures inquirers that “Organs are only removed for trans-
plantation after a person has died,” adding that “death is diagnosed by 
brain stem tests” by “two experienced doctors” using “clear and strict 
standards and procedures.” There is no reference to debates around the 
validity of the tests themselves and the concept of death they are based 
on, and no hint is given that the concept of brain death is in any way 
controversial (UK Transplant.org FAQ 7). 
11 For a selection of religious views (including Buddhist) on the related 
matter of the withdrawal of treatment see Ankeny et al. 2005.   
12 Perhaps this is why the establishment of an “eye bank” in Sri Lanka has 
been so successful. According to Ven. Dr. Sobhita Thera: “Buddhism‖s in-
fluence has made the Sri Lanka Eye Bank the biggest in the world and 
had helped millions of people in 169 countries regain their sight” 
(4ui.com).  
13 Clearly, such giving is only possible when the gift is voluntary, so un-
der a system of “presumed consent” whereby organs are taken rather 
than given, as operated in European countries like Spain, Austria, and 
Sweden, such “donation” would not seem to be in keeping with the al-
truistic spirit of these textual examples. Also of interest is Simpson 2004.  
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14 The literature is abundant. See, for example, Gervais 1986 and Young-
ner et al. 1999.  
15 This is not to suggest that the positions reached are unchangeable. For 
example, there have recently been suggestions that the position of the 
Vatican on brain death may be under review. The Vatican originally ac-
cepted that brain death represented human death, but a more skeptical 
tone is now detected by some observers. See, for example, the report of a 
meeting of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences in early February 2005 at 
http://initiative-kao.de/KAO-Braindeath_is_not_death.htm (accessed 27 
September 2008). 
16 D.ii.156.  Atha kho āyasmā ānando āyasmantaṃ anuruddhaṃ etadavoca 
– ――parinibbuto, bhante anuruddha, bhagavā‖‖ti. ――Nāvuso ānanda, 
bhagavā parinibbuto, saññāvedayitanirodhaṃ samāpanno‖‖ti. 
17 Cf. Vism 707. 
18 Yang-Gyu An, op cit, p.185 n.3.  
19 Section one of the Act entitled “Determination of Death” states: “An 
individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circula-
tory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all func-
tions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determina-
tion of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical 
standards.” 
20 E.g. Potts et al. 2000.   
21 For a study of pediatric donors, see Verheijde et al. “Growing Con-
cerns” pp.1-6. and, by the same authors, “Organ Procurement.”   
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22 Another reason commonly cited for the acceptance of the brain death 
criterion is that it allows the discontinuing of life-prolonging measures 
without incurring possible legal sanctions. 
23 A leading proponent of this view is Robert M. Veatch, most recently in 
the New England Journal of Medicine. Veatch claims that perhaps a third of 
Americans support a higher-brain or consciousness-based definition of 
death and suggests that an amendment is needed to the “dead donor 
rule” (the principle that organs should only be removed from a dead do-
nor) to allow transplants from patients who are still alive but perma-
nently unconscious. Some bioethicists even argue that there is a moral 
case for non-voluntary euthanasia to be performed on conscious patients 
diagnosed with “locked in” syndrome (see Kahane and Savulescu 2009). 
24 See, for example, the views of Dr. Robert Truog mentioned below. 
25 A recent study of “vegetative” patients using MRI scanners revealed 
brain activity in around 10% consistent with some level of awareness and 
cognition, as well as basic communication abilities. M. M. Monti and oth-
ers “Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of Consciousness,” 
New England Journal of Medicine, Online edition 18 February 2010, 
http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/NEJMoa0905370. 
26 See, for example, Field et al. 1988.   
27 According to information on the anti-brain death website KAO, “The 
production of breast milk depends on a signal sent from the anterior 
lobe of the pituitary that stimulates the secretion of milk, and possibly 
breast growth, thus requiring a functioning brain” (KAO.de).   Recall that 
the standard definition of brain death requires the loss of all brain func-
tion. 
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28 This is to avoid confusion with the notion of a “stream of ideas” that 
the word “consciousness” typically evokes. 
29 David S. Oderberg, “Bioethics Today,” The Human Life Review 98, Fall 
2008, 98-109. 
30“Delimiting Death,” Nature 461, (October 2009):570 or 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v461/n7264/full/461570a.html. 
31 Japan is the exception due in no small part to the general lack of trust 
in doctors on the part of the public. 
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